In recent years, land corruption frequently turns up at various major media and caught the attention of all walks of life. But very few researches on land corruption can be seen. These researches are limited to manifestation and countermeasures of land corruption, which lack depth and systematicity. On this basis, this paper is designed from the behavioral research perspective to study the behavioral rules and characteristics of land corruption. It also discussed the in-depth institutional reasons for land corruption through a three-dimensional system (subject, occurrence part and method of land corruption) and empirical surveys of four typical cases. The conclusion of the study may be useful for a further understanding of the real situation of land corruption.
Introduction
Currently, there lacks a widely recognized standard to define the connotation and scope of land corruption. But land corruption has already become the focus of many major news media reports. Many cases involved a large amount of money, multiple departments, multiple positions and a large number of people, which have caused huge social impacts. Land corruption, reform of state-owned enterprises corruption and major engineering project corruption are known as the "Three major corruptions in contemporary China", and were deemed as one of the six major commercial bribes to be settled. According to related statistics of
Research Overview of Corruption
The generally accepted definition of corruption refers to the behaviors of civil servants who seek personal gain improperly by using public power with method of actions or lack of actions 1 . Internationally, the research achievements on corruption are extremely abundant, which basically developed with the public policy science arose after World War II and became even more active with the research on Good Governance in recent years. The research perspective also spans across many fields such as economics, politics, sociology, and psychology, etc.
Economics have always been a major theoretical tool for researchers to study corruption. After studying the bureaucrat system of developing countries, institutional economists concluded that: corruption originates from the weakness of current system, which means the bureaucrats destroy the consensus norms because of their self-interests; from the perspective of market and transaction, some scholars deemed corruption as a process of transaction in "public power market" between officials and customers; some scholars also adopted Principle-Agent framework to analyze corruption and market distortion, and the influence of corruption on social welfare, or analyze the relevance between the private and state-owned property rights and the corruption degree from the property rights perspective, or study official's corruption by using Cost-Benefit framework from the perspective of utility and public demands; rent-seeking theory is also a popular econometric tool to study corruption. In recent years, CPI (Corruption Perceptions Index), established by Transparency International, has made remarkable contributions to the study of corruption and is recognized by numerous institutions; The Institutional Economics of Corruption and Reform, written by Johann Graf Lambsdorff who is the research leader of the organization, systematically, comprehensively and objectively summarized and compared the achievements and research methods of the researches on corruption conducted through economic approaches [1] .
Meanwhile, the research achievements on corruption from the perspective of other disciplines are also abundant. Some scholars expressed that corruption activities showed the lacking of occupational ethics and integrity in public services, which are the by-products of specific sociocultural environment, administrative power or the development process. From the perspective of public policies, complicated administrative system is also the cause to the corruption. Some scholars even pointed out that corruption is a universal phenomenon of each society, which has a strong continuity. Folklore of Comlption is very common in the social network of some developing countries. [2] . The formation of this social consensus can be also explained by "conformity" and "social pressure" in psychology. Some researchers even deduced the concepts of "moral costs" and "risk illusion" through economic approaches, which enriched the category of corruption studies from the psychological and behavioral perspectives of civil servants [3] . The adoption of psychological analysis tools not only can analyze the logic thoughts and behaviors of individual decisions in the corruption cases, but also can properly explain the occurrence and evolution of frequent corruptions, huge-amount corruptions and group corruptions.
Research Overview of Land Corruption
Currently, there are already some researches on land corruption. The content of the researches mainly includes manifestation of land corruption, causes to corruption, corruption process, consequences and harm of corruption, and measures to handle corruption, etc. Besides, many scholars chose some part of the process that corruption may happen easily, such as land planning, land renting approval, land expropriation, and land transfer, etc. The research methods mainly include zero tolerance theory, cost-benefit theory, principle-agent theory, rent-seeking theory, game theory, interpersonal relationship theory, public choice theory, and institutional economics, etc.
[4]- [9] .
In general, the research findings on land corruption are not abundant, which is a contrast to the high attention of the society. Besides, most of the researches only focus the introduction of land corruption, analysis of causes, discussion of solutions, or analysis of a specific part of land corruption. Seldom of them can study land corruption from the empirical perspective and grasp the characteristics of land corruption comprehensively. Hence, based on the definition of corruption, this study defined land corruption as: behaviors of civil servants who seek personal gain (through the method of actions or lack of actions) by improperly using public power in land resources and market management. From the behavioral research perspective, the paper studied the behavioral rules and characteristics of land corruption and discussed the in-depth institutional reasons for land corruption through the establishment of a three-dimensional system (subject, occurrence part and method of land corruption) and the empirical surveys of four typical cases, which may be useful for a further understanding of the real situation of land corruption, and raised reasonable governance policy recommendations.
Research Methods and Case Selection
The difficulty of corruption researches is the comprehensiveness and authenticity of information collection. It is hard to collect all the real information of the corruption in a certain industry or domain. The study of typical and significant cases in a particular area is still of value. Hence, the corruption cases adopted in this research are mainly cases disclosed by the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Supreme People's Court of China, as well as the corruption cases published by Xinhuanet, people.com.cn, and Procuratorial Daily, which are related to land management. The study also adopted case index analysis method to summarize and extract key information from different dimensions to analyze the cases. In the past, case studies often select a single or a few events for analysis, focusing on the case itself, and it is difficult to obtain the common characteristics of certain events, which in turn affect the follow-up analysis. Case index analysis is a method of detailed analysis of each case by constructing a statistical index system, which can better reflect the common characteristics of corruption itself and help to achieve objective and scientific conclusions. Currently, case index analysis method is one of the best methods to solve the asymmetric information of corruption, and an effective research tool to reveal the occurrence rule and development trend of corruption. In order to increase the authenticity and typicality of the research results, this paper selected four typical cases which are typical and have more detailed information from numerous cases collected. These cases have a large impact in China, in the case involved, the nature of the case, the administrative level of the offender and other aspects of a larger coverage, which increased the randomness of the research samples. Based on the selection of four typical cases, this study established a case analysis index system according to the research objectives, including 2 types of first class indexes, and 19 second class indexes. Then, based on the indexes, the study analyzed the cases one by one, extracted key information and built the analysis texts as shown in Table 1 .
Empirical Analysis
"Behaviorism" is a genre arose in the early 20 th century, which studies administrative phenomenon with the perspectives and approaches of behaviorism. The purport of behaviorism is to study the motivation mode and effect of related personnel from their actual behaviors. According to the research perspective of behaviorism, a complete behavior can be described from six elements as subject, object, occurrence part, method, purpose/motivation, and harm. From the perspective of behaviorism, land corruption behaviors can be also studied from the six aspects. But the three aspects of subject, occurrence part and method can reflect the behavior nature most. Therefore, this paper selected the three dimensions as corruption subject, occurrence part and method to establish the research framework for land corruption behaviors, then concluded the empirical research results through the index statistics and content analysis of the four typical cases (see Table 2 ).
Subject of Land Corruption Behaviors
According to the above definition of land corruption, the subject of land corruption behaviors refers to the authority who possess or have influence on land resources and market management. The following part is an empirical study on 
Concentrated Ages of Land Corruption Subjects
As shown in the four typical cases, the ages of the corruption subjects are mainly ranged from 40 to 50 when the crime started, and 50 to 60 when the crime reported. Generally, 40 -60 is the age when the corruption subject holds large power. They are in the peak of their career and corruption is easily to happen.
Involving Large Amounts of Money and Lands with Far-Reaching Influences
The rareness and non-renewable character of lands fundamentally decided that land management corruption will involve large amounts of money. For the four typical cases, the case of Meng Qingping involved the lowest amount (250,000 yuan), the case of Luo Yaping involved the highest amount (60 million yuan), and the average amount is 16.86 million yuan. This shows that land management corruption usually involves a large amount of money. In addition, personal involvement usually ranged from 1 million to 6 million yuan. The case of Dai Yuejin and Li Jianghua is the most typical. Luo Yaping, a section level official who is also known as the so-called "land grandma", gave full play of her power in land expropriation and approval. She used fake documents to take land compensation and resell land resources. The involved amount is more than 60 million yuan, making Luo Yaping a "giant corrupt official". When this case happed 
Corruption Part of Land Corruption Behavior

Analysis of Land Corruption Behavior Part and Corruption Risk Points of Corruption
The main content of land management can be summarized as following seven aspects: formulation of land policies and regulations, cadastral management, land supply and market management, land planning and land use regulation, cultivated land protection and land reclamation, farmland transference and land expropriation, land law enforcement and supervision. Some scholars pointed out that the longer the land industrial chain, the longer the power-for-money deal chain. Power-for-money deals and officer-trader collusions exist in almost each part of the land business, such as the part from land expropriation to land transfer, the part from paying land transfer fees to adjusting plot ratio, the part from land usage registration to property right registration, and the part from the project planning and approval to the project site selection. Any part of land purchase and storage, land demolition, land consolidation, land survey and land planning that are managed by land departments may contain huge rent-seeking space. This paper adopted index analysis method to extract keywords from the four cases, combed and sorted the data, and summarized the major corruptions parts and risk points. 
3) Land corruption behaviors and methods
The research on land management corruption behaviors and methods is helpful in understanding the crime tactics and effectively prevent corruption behaviors. Currently, land management corruption methods tend to be more diversified, professional, intelligent and convert.
First, the crime tactics are more secret. Corrupt officials used fictional and backdated land expropriation documents to illegally transact state-owned land use rights certificates. They would also use professional land planning methods to make slight adjustment on the plot ratio, making it hard to be noticed. Secondly, the corruption methods are more convert. Many corruption officials usually conduct various methods to cover their corruption behaviors, such as false receipt for a loan, borrow money to buy houses, buy houses at a low price or resell the houses for personal earnings, invest in real estate companies or cooperate with them, as well as various seeking and accepting bribes in the name of festivals, overseas training, children's weddings, and sick in hospital, etc. For example, Luo Yaping bought 22 housing estates in the name of her relatives to conceal the properties sources of her family.
Thirdly, corruption behaviors are more diversified. Corruption behaviors mainly include direct behaviors and indirect behaviors. The direct method means to intervene related business directly, mainly in cadastral management, land transfer and land approval domains, such as illegal transactions, letting out auction information, instructions in person and issuing instruction notes, etc. Meng Qingping, deputy governor of Hainan Province, made instructions twice during his office term to help Zhuang (individual business) backdate, post-register land expropriation proceedings, and get the lands of Po Bo village, Hai Kou. Meng cooperated with others to run the business and gained huge profits. Indirect methods mainly include implication, inciting, enjoinment, giving orders, organization and coordination, and exerting pressure, etc. Indirect methods are mainly used in obtaining land use rights and land approval, etc.
Further Discussion
Causes to Land Corruption
Institutional factors are the primary cause of corruption. The land corruption in China has revealed the design and contents problem of the existing land system. Besides, it also reflects the contradiction between the operation and practice of the land system.
Power Imbalance Caused by Institutional Deficiency
To analyze the generation mechanism of rampant land corruption, the start should be China's special land system and supervision system. for the land corruption of local officials to some extent. In addition, the current unreasonable expropriation standard makes the cost of expropriation cost very cheap and expropriation "benefits" very enormous. The local government can obtain huge "land price differences". Hence, the government's monopolization on land supply as stated in relevant laws and regulations provided an institutional space for corrupt officials to use lands to gain illegal benefits.
More importantly, the government acts as a dual role of judge and athletes on land management. As stated in relevant laws, the government is the representative of public interests who makes policies and owns the approval rights, serving as the judge; on the other aspect, the local government holds a large number of land resources who takes part in economic activities as a subject. They can both expropriate lands and sell the lands, serving as the athletes. That's to say, the government has monopolized the approval rights for infrastructure, industry and real estate projects as well as the legal expropriation rights for the lands these projects required. After land expropriation, the local government also holds the pricing rights for the lands. If the enterprises want to get the lands for their projects, they have to seek rent from the government officials. Thus a benefit conveyor chain is formed.
Impacts of Fiscal Decentralization on Local Economic Behaviors
According to the tax-sharing system in 1994, the urban and rural land use tax, real estate tax, stamp tax, land value increment tax, and state-owned land compensable use tax are levied by local governments. This makes the fiscal revenue of the local government mainly from various fiscal revenues by transferring land use rights [6] . Lands become another "way of making money" after developing township enterprises.
As a result, the local government considers to increase land fiscal revenue by taking advantage of the deficiencies of China's current land system. According to The Law of Land Administration of China, only the local government has the right to transfer lands, and rural lands can be transferred only when they are transformed into state-owned lands. As a consequence, local government officials usually use their land approval rights and transfer the lands at a low price to "attract investments". Even when low-price land transfer is prohibited by the State Council, they still transfer lands at a low price in disguise by signing land transfer contract first and then returning the land transfer fees or providing fiscal subsidies. The result is that officials and enterprises can transfer benefits to each other, and some enterprises also occupy lands maliciously or resell the 
Promotion Incentives Intensified the Interests and Competition of Local Government Officials
To some extent, Chinese-style fiscal decentralization has stimulated the local government in selling lands, who taking lands as a new "way of making money".
However, the appraisal mechanism of the central government on local government officials also exerted great impacts on the economic behaviors of the officials. In another word, the promotion incentives under fiscal decentralization has aggravated the rampant land corruption to a certain degree.
The central government implements target-oriented responsibility system for the appraisal of local government officials, and "one-vote negation system" for indexes of GPD growth rate, family planning and stability maintenance [10] .
Under the system with GDP growth rate as the major appraisal index of promoting local government officials, a promotion tournament system was formed.
Under such system, local government officials compete with each other to seek high GDP growth rate. To some extent, this phenomenon can explain why fiscal 
Governance of Land Corruption
Reform of Land System; Tighten Constraints on Administrative
Power First, there should be an end to local government's monopoly of land supply for construction. Rural lands for construction should be given direct access to market on the premise that it is consistent with the overall planning. None-agricultural land rights of construction lands listed in the planning should be allowed to be transferred freely. This way, there will be more supplies of construction lands, thus bringing in a secondary market for construction land. Secondly, a fair and transparent land transaction market should be established; the "bidding, auction and listing" system for productive lands should be improved. At present, the costs of land corruption are relatively low due to information inequity, non-transparent transaction, and irregular procedures. This is a major cause to rampant and all-pervasive land corruption. Therefore, the procedures of "bidding, auction and listing" should be normalized, and perspicuous rules on land transaction should be laid down to promote market operation. Furthermore, it is important to improve the construction of land market and establish a tangible G. D. Zhu, Y. B. Yu Open Journal of Social Sciences land market to prevent land corruption. Thirdly, the land approval system should be improved. Land corruption has close relations with administrative approval. Hence, the lack of constraints and supervision on approval power will sure lead to corruption. In respect to land lease, the administrative approval process should be strengthened and perfect systematic restrictive mechanisms should be established. It is also important to regulate land office's administrative approval power. The service standards, procedures, time limit, and responsibilities should be made public. The public has the right to know the information about land usage, land price and registration. The rights should be balanced; a healthy collective decision-making system should be created. The approval of construction land, the management of land assets, the pricing of land and other important land issues should first be discussed within the land office before a collective decision is made. Lastly, the government should intensify their supervision on land lease and strengthen the supervisory mechanism since the lack of an effective supervisory mechanism is a major cause of rampant land corruption.
Proper Division of Central and Local Government's Financial
Power and Administrative Duties First, the existing tax system should be reformed and the allocation proportion of shared tax should be reset to properly increase the proportion of local government (i.e. value-added tax); local governments should be empowered with relevant policy-making authority, allowing them to expand local tax categories and sources to acquire certain amount of money to replenish the fund for public goods. Secondly, local government should strengthen their management of extra-budgetary capital. In the existing tax system, most tax revenues are in the hands of central government, which is a direct cause of local government's extra-budgetary capital expansion and heavy dependence on "land finance".
Hence, local government should tighten their controls on this part of extra-budgetary capital to eradicate the source of land corruption. Lastly, the inter-government transfer payment system should be modified. The current tax system is highly centralized; local governments rely heavily on central government's transfer payment when trying to finish their tasks, especially in the central and western regions. Both the vertical and horizontal transfer payment should be reinforced; the proportion of recurrent special subsidies should be reduced while the percentage of general financial subsidies should be increased.
Consequently, the interest allocation structure of central and local government can be promoted; the financial power of the government will be proportional to its administrative duties, thus eradicating the internal impetus to make money through lands. lihood issues. Therefore, it is urgent to reform the existing incentive system for local officials and increase some new incentive measures. This way, local officials will be encouraged to pay more attention to local populace and still be responsible for their due missions. Meanwhile, the importance of GDP growth and its related indexes should be weakened. New indexes concerning livelihood and sustainable development should be added to the existing appraisal system. The level of local public service and citizens' satisfaction should also be brought into the appraisal function. The behaviors of officials will not be constrained by political tournaments, and the incentives for officials will be changed. The "vicious" competitions between local governments will eventually become "healthy". In respect to the selection of officials, it is important to change local officials' attitude towards responsibility. Most officials tend to attach great importance to the appraisal of their superior authorities while neglecting the opinions and satisfaction of their subordinates and the populace. Therefore, the officials should not be assigned by their direct superior authority. More channels should be provided for people to express their interest appeals. In addition, local populace should be given more rights, enabling them to form effective constraints on local officials' behaviors through the "vote-by-hand" selection mechanism. These in-depth adjustments can effectively restrain the source of the rampant land corruption, thus gradually eradicating land corruption.
Establishment of Scientific Political Achievements
Conclusions and Enlightenment
Land corruption has become increasingly rampant in recent years. This paper is an empirical analysis of 4 typical cases about land corruption. An index analysis framework is established to analyze each case. In order to study the land corruption behaviors, a "three in one" logic structure is created including corruption behavior subject, behavior part, and behavior methods. Furthermore, the features and laws of land management corruption are discussed to acquire the facts in land management domain.
According to this empirical research, it is found that the behavior subject in land management corruption is a feature to be dense in certain age groups, which has a tendency towards systematization and expansion; besides, group corruption and collapse corruption are very common. As regards the behavior part, land management corruption occurs in specific realm and includes many parts and distinct high-incidence fields (e.g. cadastral management, land supply, and market management). The corruption behavior methods are diversified, specialized, intelligent, and highly covert. The phenomenon of land corruption is actually the performance of irrationality in the current land system, financial system and official incentive system in China. It is necessary for the government and the people to continue to explore and optimize the system design.
But there are still some limitations in the research. More specifically, the reliability of research findings is subject to the size of the samples, and it is impossible 
